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Abstract: After reviewing the hole argument and its relations with initial value problem and general
covariance, we shall discuss how much freedom one has to define the physical state of a system in a
generally covariant (or gauge covariant) field theory.
We shall show that in gauge covariant theories (and generally covariant theories with a a compact space)
one has no freedom and one is forced to declare as physically equivalent two configurations which differ by
a gauge transformation (or by a global spacetime diffeomorphism), as it is usually prescribed.
On the contrary, when space is not compact, the result proven for the compact case does not hold true and
one may have different options to define physically equivalent configurations, still preserving determinism.
1. Introduction
After almost a century since formulation of General Relativity (GR) it is still not clear and
unanimously accepted what exactly Einstein discovered and what are the foundations of GR; see
[1] and references quoted therein. The emphasis on different assumptions (covariance principle
in its active or passive form, equivalence principle in its weak or strong form, Mach’s principle,
coincidence principle just to quote the most used ones) has been moved many times since
1915 and moved differently by different authors. Not an exception is the meaning of the hole
argument (which will be reviewed below) and the problem of observability, i.e. the definition of
what has to be understood by physical state in a covariant theory; see [2]. Originally, Einstein
formulated the hole argument in terms of boundary problems (see [3]) while soon after Hilbert
reformulated it in terms of Cauchy problems.
Back in 1917 Kretschmann raised an argument claiming that (just because of Einstein coin-
cidence principle) any theory can be reformulated into a covariant form and as a consequence
covariance principle has no physical content; see [4]. As a matter of fact neither Kretschmann
argument nor coincidence principle has ever been given a precise form. In particular although
his argument seems convincing and well supported by relevant examples, it was never clarified
what one should understand by any theory or which transformations one should be ready to
apply to a theory to make it generally covariant. Since then, the consensus for Kretschmann
has grown from an isolated critique to mainstream and the covariance principle has been pro-
gressively marginalised to a heuristic role. On the other hand, the hole argument can be used
also with gauge theories and gauge covariance, while apparently nobody claims that gauge
covariance is a vacuous principle; see [5].
At the same time, Utiyama-like arguments (see [6], [7], [8]) have been routinely used to in
fact select covariant dynamics, i.e. to do exactly what Kretschmann argument says covariance
principles should be unable to do. Moreover, the equivalence principle, which has gradually
replaced covariance principle as the accepted physical core of GR (see [9], [10]), has been
shown to be a consequence of essentially covariance requests (at least in its weak form, i.e. as
the claim that the free fall motion of any body is described by geodesics equations); see [11].
Norton described this situation and noticed that one is not even forced to take a stand for one or
the other party; see [12]. In Kretschmann’s argument he was in fact discussing the possibility
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of setting up a covariant formulation for any theory, possibly at the price of introducing as
many fields and equations as needed with whatever meaning is needed to achieve the goal of
covariantisation, which seems to be a reasonable claim. In all other arguments (from Utiyama to
weak equivalence principle) one instead works with a fixed set of fields, in a Lagrangian setting
or with additional requirements such as absence of background structures; see [13], [14].
There is also another issue strictly connected to the hole argument. In most cases (actually,
to the best of our knowledge, in all of them) the hole argument is formulated in terms of
compactly supported diffeomorphisms; see [9], [10], [15], [16]. The name of the argument
refers to a compact region, the hole, in which the diffeomorphism is not the identity. Originally
Einstein argued that by a diffeomorphism supported in the hole and in view of active general
covariance, one could show that the value of the metric field in the region is not determined by
its value outside the region and on its boundary.
However, by analysing the hole argument is terms of initial value problems, the holes emerge
naturally to be much more general. What is needed is in fact that one can find a Cauchy surface
out of the hole, not requiring in general the hole to be compact at all; see [17]. In fact one can
consider diffeomorphisms which are the identity in a region around a Cauchy surface enlarging
the hole to cover the whole M except a neighbourhood of the Cauchy surface. These spacetime
diffeomorphisms will be called Cauchy-compatible transformations or Cauchy transformations
for short. A Cauchy transformation leaves a Cauchy surface untouched with a neighbourhood
of it, i.e. it preserves the initial conditions. On the other hand, it produces a different solution
since it is not the identity away from the Cauchy surface, compromising the uniqueness of
solutions in Cauchy problems.
This form of the hole argument for Cauchy problems shows that essentially general covariance
cannot mathematically coexist with Cauchy well–posed problems. Norton also argued (see
[1]) that the definition of physical state is something to be discussed in physics and it is not
something which can be settled by a purely mathematical argument. This position is certainly
plausible and agreeable. However, we shall here argue that some constraints to the definition of
physical state can be in fact put on a mathematical stance (the ones which go back to Einstein-
Hilbert about well-poseness of Cauchy problem or boundary problem). And a detailed analysis
of these issues shows an unexpected structure of cases which is not clarified in general, yet.
What is clear is that assuming, as usually done, that the physical state of a covariant theory
is to be identified with equivalence classes of configurations modulo spacetime diffeomorphisms
is a fair assumption, still a choice which is sometimes forced by mathematics (in particular by
determinism in the form of Cauchy theorem) but sometimes it is one of many possible choices
which, in those cases, we agree should be addressed from a physical stance.
The relation between general (and gauge) covariance and observables in a theory has been
analysed in detail in the literature; see [1], [12], [14], [15], [18]. Einstein general covariance,
his hole argument and Kretschmann’s counterargument have been discussed since 1917; see [4].
In most cases general covariance has been identified in its active form with covariance with
respect to general diffeomorphisms in spacetime and accordingly two configurations which are
mapped one into the other by a spacetime diffeomorphism are considered to represent the same
single physical state. We shall here take a more minimalistic attitude and discuss what are the
mathematical constraint in defining physical states. We shall discuss that sometimes one can
find subclasses of diffeomorphisms (the group generated by Cauchy-compatible transformations)
which play a distinctive role in the discussion and which to the best of our knowledge have not
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properly been taken into account in standard frameworks.
Let us start, for the sake of simplicity, by restricting to generally covariant theories. Gauge
theories will be briefly discussed in the conclusions since most of what we shall do easily applies
to those more general cases, as well; see [19] for general framework and notation.
In a generally covariant theory one has a huge group of symmetries S containing the (lift to the
configuration bundle of the) spacetime diffeomorphisms Diff(M), and in particular spacetime
diffeomorphisms which can be connected by a flow with the identity idM , namely Diffe(M).
Any element Φ ∈ Diffe(M) can be obtained by evaluating a 1-parameter subgroup Φs at s = 1,
i.e. Φ = Φ1. The 1-parameter subgroup Φs is also called a flow of diffeomorphisms.
The standard attitude is to assume that in a generally covariant theory any two configurations
of fields differing by any spacetime diffeomorphism represent the same physical state. In other
words, if σ is a section of the configuration bundle and Φ∗σ = σ
′ is its image through a
diffeomorphism (in Diffe(M) or in Diff(M) depending on the case) then both σ and σ
′ represent
the same physical state of the system.
Let us call gauge transformations the group of transformations G which fix the physical state.
As a matter of fact defining the group of gauge transformations is equivalent to define the
physical state. Either one defines the physical state as the orbits of the action of gauge trans-
formations or defines gauge transformations as the transformations mapping one representative
of the physical state into another representative of the same physical state.
In order for this to make sense one needs a gauge transformation Φ to be a symmetry of the
system (as it is in generally covariant theories) since if σ is a solution, of course also σ′ must
be a solution as well. In other words any gauge transformation (acting on configurations but
leaving the physical state unchanged) must be a symmetry and the symmetry group is a upper
bound to the group of gauge transformations, i.e. one must have G ⊂ S.
We shall show that there is a lower bound (which will be denoted by ~D) for the gauge group
G as well, i.e. one must have ~D ⊂ G ⊂ S.
We shall argue that in principle the group ~D ⊂ S = Diffe(M) leaves a certain freedom in setting
G between its lower and upper bounds, i.e. that one may have ~D  S. In these cases one has
different options to set the gauge group ~D ⊂ G ⊂ S and each different assumption about what G
is in fact defines a different theory with the same dynamics but different interpretation of what
is the physical state and what can be in principle observed. We shall also discuss topological
conditions on M for which this freedom is nullified and one is forced to set G = Diffe(M) as
usually done in the literature.
If you consider Kepler mechanical system, the symmetry group S contains rotations (and in that
case one can show that ~D = {e} is trivial). In that situations one is free to consider rotations
as gauge transformations or not. That corresponds to considering absolute angles as observables
or not. That in turn goes back to decide if the observer has access to fixed stars (to be used
as a reference to measure absolute angles) or not (so that measuring absolute angles becomes
impossible). The two options can be considered as two different physical systems since we can
measure different things in the two cases.
The lower bound for G is set by requiring field equations to be deterministic on the physical
states by implementing the hole argument. Let us first review this argument in its essential form
and directly connect it to determinism of field equations. The same argument is the standard
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proof that field equations in a (general or gauge) covariant theory are not deterministic for the
configurations, i.e. the configuration are a redundant description of the physical state, which is
the essence of gauge theories.
ADM splittings and Cauchy problems
In order to present the hole argument we have to state Cauchy theorem for field equations.
For that we need to introduce ADM splittings of M .
Definition: An ADM splitting of a spacetime M is a bundle structure t : M → R.
The projection t associates to any event x ∈ M a number t(x) = t0 ∈ R which called the
ADM-time for x. The fibers t−1(t0) ⊂M are called isochronous hypersurfaces (at the time t0),
they are denoted also by t−1(t0) = Σt0 and they are diffeomorphic to the standard fiber Σ ≃ Σt0 .
Since the base R of the ADM splitting is contractible, the bundle is necessarily trivial, i.e. one
has global trivializations and M ≃ R× Σ. Accordingly, a global ADM splitting is not possible
on general manifolds. If a spacetime manifold allows an ADM splitting it must be diffeomorphic
to a product R×Σ and it is called a globally hyperbolic manifold. In order to be able to define
a well-posed Cauchy problem we have to restrict the spacetime M to be globally hyperbolic.
Hence hereafter we shall assume M ≃ R× Σ.
The fields σ can be decomposed to fields on the space hypersurface Σ. In a Cauchy problem
one assigns the value of fields and their (time)-derivatives on a Cauchy surface Σ0 and field
equations determine their evolution in time and allow to rebuild the covariant field σ which is
a solution of field equations; see [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [17], [26].
To be true some of field equations only give constraints on initial conditions and, at the same time,
some of the spatial fields on Σ are left undetermined and parametrize the ADM splittings. That
is another story not completely unrelated to symmetries but let us overview this viewpoint.
The hole argument
Let us consider a spacetime diffeomorphism Φ : M → M which is the identity on an open
set t−1(I) for some open interval I ⊂ R (and it is different from the identity somewhere).
Two configurations σ and Φ∗σ have the same initial conditions on a Cauchy surface Σ0 which
projects on a time t0 ∈ I ⊂ R. Such a diffeomorphism Φ which is the identity around a Cauchy
surface will be called a Cauchy transformation. The set of all Cauchy diffeomorphisms will be
denoted by D1 ⊂ Diffe(M). Since Φ ∈ D
1 is also a symmetry, if σ is a solution then σ′ = Φ∗σ
is also a solution, a different solution corresponding to the very same initial conditions set on
Σ0. Accordingly, initial conditions and field equations do not uniquely select a solution and the
Cauchy problem is not well-posed.
The only way out if one wants to save determinism at least for the physical states is to identify
σ and σ′ as two different representations of one single physical state. One can say that there is an
equivalence relation ∼ which defines the physical states as equivalence classes of configurations.
As far as different representatives of the same physical state are connected by symmetries, field
equations are compatible to quotient induced by the equivalence relation ∼ and define field
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equations on physical states which are deterministic.
The group of gauge transformations G should contain at least finite compositions of Cauchy
diffeomorphisms. We can set D2 for diffeomorphisms which can be written as a composition of
two Cauchy diffeomorphisms, i.e.
D2 = {Φ = φ1 ◦ φ2 : φ1, φ2 ∈ D
1} (1.1)
Of course, one has D1 ⊂ D2 and, in general, neither D1 or D2 are groups since they are not
closed by composition.
Thus one can iterate the definition of Dn for diffeomorphisms which can be written as a
composition of n Cauchy diffeomorphisms and ~D for diffeomorphisms which can be written as
a composition of a finite number of Cauchy diffeomorphisms. Then one has the inclusions
D1 ⊂ D2 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Dn ⊂ . . . ⊂ ~D ⊂ Diffe(M) ≡ S (1.2)
The set ~D ⊂ Diffe(M) is a group and it is the lower bound for gauge transformations. If
one did not have ~D ⊂ G, then the relation ∼ defined by gauge equivalence would not induce
deterministic field equations for the physical states. Thus one can set gauge transformations at
will, provided that one has ~D ⊂ G ⊂ S.
Now in some cases it may happen that ~D = S so that one is forced to set G = S as usually
done in relativistic and gauge theories. We shall show below that for example this is the case
every time Σ is compact. As a special case one has the relativistic point particles for which
Σ is compact since it is made of one point only and one is forced to accept that two curves
in spacetime which differ by a reparametrization do describe the same physical state. This is
why parametrizations of worldlines are depleted of a direct physical meaning and two different
parametrizations of the same worldline trajectory do describe the same motion.
Let us stress the argument just presented above once again. We have general mathematical con-
straints for what should be the physical state for a relativistic particle. One can show that these
constraints imply that reparametrizations of the worldline trajectories are gauge transformations.
Then we assume that the physical state is described by worldline trajectories. This is purely a
mathematical argument.
On the other hand we can discuss the motion in spacetimes of particles on a physical stance and
show that it is reasonable to assume that the physical state is described by worldline trajectories
and parametrizations are irrelevant. The two viewpoints come (quite independently) to the same
conclusion, which is a good thing.
We shall show that this is not the general situation. There exist cases in which the mathematical
constraints do not force a definition but leave some (though not complete) freedom which has to
be fixed by further physical considerations. However, until mathematics forces the choice or puts
constraints to what should be physically decided we believe it is worth doing it on a mathematical
stance.
We shall also show a counter example, showing a globally hyperbolic spacetime M = R ×
R in which the situation is different from the compact space case. As a consequence the
usual assumption of identifying configurations which differ by a diffeomorphism is a legitimate
though in general unmotivated choice. When describing a system one should be aware of which
assumptions come from mathematical constraints and which assumptions are done on a physical
stance.
When setting up a covariant theory one should first study whether the group ~D is a strict
subgroup of Diffe(M). If it is, one should characterise possible subgroups ~D G S. Then one
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should declare which of such groups ~D  G  S is elected as a gauge group. Different choices
lead to different theories with an equivalent dynamics but different observables.
2. Compact Space Case
Hereafter we shall prove that if the space manifold Σ is compact then necessarily one has
D1  D2 = . . . = ~D = S. In these theories one has no freedom and has to set G = Diffe(M).
Two configurations which are mapped one into the other by a spacetime diffeomorphism Φ ∈
Diffe(M) (has it is usually done) define the same physical state.
Let us consider an ADM splitting of M ≃ R × Σ with Σ a compact (m − 1)-dimensional
manifold.
Lemma: If the transformation Φ = Φs=1 ∈ Diffe(M) can be written as a composition of
two Cauchy diffeomorphisms Φ = φ1 ◦ φ2 (with φ1 , φ2 ∈ D
1) then the diffeomorphism Φˆ :=
Φ ◦ φ−12 = φ1 is the identity in a region t
−1(I1) ⊂M for some open set I1 ⊂ R and it coincides
with the given Φ in a region t−1(I2) ⊂M for some open set I2 ⊂ R.
Proof: In fact both φ1 and φ2 are Cauchy transformations and hence they coincide with the
identity in t−1(I1) and t
−1(I2), respectively. In the region t
−1(I1) one has that φ1 is the identity
and Φˆ = φ1 coincides with the identity as well. In the region t
−1(I2) one has that φ2 is the
identity and Φˆ = Φ coincides with the original transformation Φ.
Such a diffeomorphism Φˆ which is the identity in a region t−1(I1) ⊂ M for some open set
I1 ⊂ R and it coincides with the given Φ in a region t
−1(I2) ⊂ M for some open set I2 ⊂ R is
called a splitter for Φ.
Thus we can look for a splitter Φˆ for Φ. If we find it then we can write
Φ =
(
Φ ◦ Φˆ−1
)
◦ Φˆ
and Φˆ is a Cauchy transformation since it is the identity in the region t−1(I1) while Φ ◦ Φˆ
−1 is
a Cauchy transformation as it is the identity in the region t−1(I2). Thus Φ ∈ D
2. Accordingly,
the diffeomorphism Φ ∈ Diffe(M) is in D
2 iff there exists a splitter for it.
First let us notice that we can define a function ϕˆ : R→ R supported in [−α, α], smooth everywhere,
with a maximum in 0 such that ϕˆ(0) = 1. For example we can set
ϕˆ(t) =


exp
(
− a
2t2
α2−t2
)
t ∈ (−α, α)
0 otherwise
(2.1)
Thus the function
ϕ+(t) =
1
N
∫ t
−∞
ϕˆ(t′)dt′ (2.2)
and fix N(a) so that ϕ+(α) = 1. The function ϕ+(t) is a step-like smooth functions which is 0 in
the region t ≤ −α and 1 in the region t ≥ α with the derivative in [−α, α] which is in (0, 1α ].
Let us also define the function ϕ−(t) = 1 − ϕ+(t) which is decreasing, is 1 in the region t ≤ −α
and 0 in the region t ≥ α with the derivative in [−α, α] which is in [− 1α , 0).
Let us show that:
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Theorem: For any Φ ∈ Diffe(M) we can define a splitter φ for Φ.
Proof: Since Φ ∈ Diffe(M) we have a flow Φs such that Φ = Φ(s=1). The infinitesimal generator
of that flow ξ is a complete spacetime vector field.
Then let us consider the vector field ξ+ = ϕ+(t(x)) · ξ, denote its flow by φˆs and set φ = φˆ(s=1)
which is a diffeomorphism by construction.
Now let us notice that an integral curve of ξ+ is a reparametrization of an integral curve of ξ.
If we set initial condition in the region t(x) > α (where ξˆ = ξ) and we have to follow the flow
φˆs until s = 1, this may not be as following the flow Φs up to s = 1. In fact, at some point,
before s = 1, the integral curve may get to the region t(x) < α, feeling a generator ξ+ 6= ξ and
slow down with respect to the integral curve of Φs.
In order to avoid this, one should consider curves that will not exit from the region t(x) > α.
This can easily be done by considering the space Σα at t = α and considering Σ
′ = Φ−1(Σα):
an integral curve starting at a point on the right of Σ′ will be an integral curve of ξ at least
until the parameter is s ≤ 1.
Now consider the function f : Σ → R : x 7→ t(Φ−1(x)). This is defined on a compact and it
attends its maximum, say t0. Then if one considers the integral curve of ξ+ starting at a point
x0 with t(x0) > t0, then such a curve is an integral curve of ξ as well and, accordingly, one has
φˆ(x0) = Φ(x0).
Then the two diffeomorphisms φˆ and Φ coincide in the region t(x) > t0 and φˆ = idM in the
region t(x) < −α. Hence in any event the map φ is a splitter for Φ and then Φ ∈ D2.
Since any Φ ∈ Diffe(M) is also in Φ ∈ D
2 then one has
D1  D2 = . . . = Dn = ~D = Diffe(M) (2.3)
and one has no option than to set G = Diffe(M). All diffeomorphisms are gauge transformations
and they preserve the physical state.
In other words, when Σ is compact, the usual choice of setting G = Diffe(M) is forced (and
supported) by a purely mathematical argument.
3. The spatial non-compact case
The argument for compact spaces does not work in the non-compact case since one is unable
to guarantee that the function f has a maximum. It would be quite natural to conjecture that
also for spatially non-compact case one still had D2 = Diffe(M), possibly by a different proof.
However, this is false in general. Let us first exhibit a counterexample. Let us considerM = R2
which is split by the ADM foliation as M ≃ R × R → R; ADM coordinates on R2 are (t, x)
and the projection reads as π : R2 → R : (t, x) 7→ t. Let us consider the diffeomorphism
Φ : R2 → R2 ∈ Diffe(M) given by{
t′ = cos(t2 + x2)t− sin(t2 + x2)x
x′ = sin(t2 + x2)t+ cos(t2 + x2)x
(3.1)
which is in fact a diffeomorphism since its Jacobian is nowhere degenerate (being J = 1 every-
where) and being in the flow of the vector field ξ = (t2 + x2)(x∂t − t∂x). One can easily check
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that Φ 6∈ D1 since its fixed points are the origin and a discrete sets of circles around it (the ones
of radius r2 = t2 + x2 = 2kπ with k ∈ Z) so that Φ is not the identity on any vertical line.
The map Φ maps vertical stripes around in a spiral as shown in Figure 1. Thus the spiral
is driven around and forced to have points on the right and on the left of any other vertical
stripe. Accordingly, if for some reason one has that the image of a vertical stripe needs to be
all on one side of some other vertical stripe a contradiction is obtained. In other words, one has
precisely that the function f defined for the compact space case above attends no maximum or
minimum.
Figure 1: Mapping a vertical stripe (light) into a spiral (dark)
by means of the diffeomorphism Φ
One can easily show that Φ 6∈ D2; for, let us suppose for the sake of argument that one can
write Φ = φ1 ◦ φ2 with φ1, φ2 ∈ D
1 and denote by Ui = π
−1(Ii) with Ii intervals in R so that
φi is the identity on the vertical stripe Ui. The two intervals I1 and I2 are disjoint (if not Φ
would be in D1). With no loss of generality we can choose I1 < I2 (meaning that any point in
I1 is on the left of any point in I2); if this were not the case one can repeat the argument for
Φ−1 = φ−12 ◦ φ
−1
1 (being that Φ ∈ D
2 if and only if Φ−1 ∈ D2).
In view of the projection π and the ordering of the base manifold R, one can define a partial
ordering of points in R2 writing p < q if π(p) < π(q). As in R, one can write p < U for a subset
U ⊂ R2 if ∀q ∈ U : p < q. Finally, given two subsets U,U ′ ⊂ R2 one can write U < U ′ if ∀p ∈ U
and q ∈ U ′ : p < q. Let us remark that a map φ1 ∈ D
1 which is the identity on a stripe U1 maps
the left (right) region into itself. Thus one has that for any p < U1 then one has φ1(p) < U1.
Now consider a point p ∈ U2; one has φ2(p) = p and φ1(p) = Φ(p). Since φ1 is the identity
on U1 and U1 < p then U1 < Φ(p). Thus the diffeomorphism Φ maps the stripe U2 to the right
of U1, i.e. we write U1 < Φ(U2). However, since the stripe U2 go up and down to infinity, the
spiral Φ(U2) is driven around and sooner or later it will be forced to be on the left of U1. By
the contradiction one concludes that Φ cannot the written as Φ = φ1 ◦ φ2, i.e. Φ 6∈ D
2.
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Thus in the cases for which the space manifold is non-compact one can have diffeomorphisms
of M which are not in D2 and, accordingly, one has D2  Diffe(M).
With some more effort one can show that the diffeomorphism Φ here considered is not in D3;
see Appendix A below. Thus one has that D3 Diffe(M). However, this direct approach to D
n
grows too difficult since this direct proof needs to consider in Dn all the possible orderings of
the stripes Ui on which the diffeomorphisms φi reduce to the identity once one assumes that
Φ = φ1 ◦φ2 ◦ . . .◦φn. In other words the length of the direct proof grows as n!/2 and it becomes
soon too long. One can improve the situation (though not substantially) by considering some
general results; see Appendix B below. However, further investigation in that direction is
needed.
To the best of our knowledge it is still unclear whether one has ~D = Diffe(M) in general or in
the spatial non-compact case one could have ~D Diffe(M). We stress that this problem should
be addressed before defining the physical state, for example by setting G = Diffe(M). In fact,
if one had ~D  Diffe(M) all one could know for sure is that the gauge group should be chosen
to be ~D ⊂ G ⊂ Diffe(M) and at least two different options (namely, ~D = G and G = Diffe(M))
exist.
Different choices correspond to different classes of configurations representing the physical
states, and hence quantities which are observable by one choice may be unobservable with the
other. When this freedom exists, the definition of the physical state has to be decided on a
physical ground and different choices correspond to different definitions of the system. The
standard choice G = Diffe(M) is legitimate and it is in a sense canonical. Still, one should know
if it was a choice among many possibilities or it was forced by the nature of the problem, for
example as it happens when the space manifold is compact.
4. Conclusions and Perspectives
We showed that the group G of gauge transformations needs to contain the group ~D generated
by Cauchy diffeomorphisms (otherwise initial conditions do not single out uniquely a solution
for field equations) and must be contained in the symmetry group S = Diffe(M) of the theory
(otherwise field equations are not compatible with the definition of physical state as equivalence
class of configurations under the action of G).
In globally hyperbolic spacetimes M ≃ R× Σ if Σ is compact then one can prove ~D = S and
one is forced to fix G to the whole symmetry group.
When Σ is non-compact then one still has ~D ⊂ S but in some cases the inclusion may be strict.
Hence in these cases one has some freedom and different options to fix the group G of gauge
transformations.
If one now considers gauge covariant theories, the group of symmetries contains all flows of
vertical principal automorphisms of the structure bundle P , i.e. S = AutV (P ). Let us denote
by π the projection of the structure bundle P and by t : M → R the ADM projection. Such
flows Φs are locally generated by pure gauge transformations, namely they are in the form{
x′µ = xµ
g′ = αs(x) · g
(4.1)
for some local function αs(x) ∈ G. As we can dump diffeomorphisms in a region, we can also
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dump vertical automorphisms by defining
Φˆ+(p) = Φϕ(t(π(p))(p) Φˆ−(p) = Φ1−ϕ(t(π(p))(p) (4.2)
Both Φˆ± are Cauchy gauge transformations in D
1 and
Φˆ+ ◦ Φˆ−(p) =Φϕ(t(π(Φ1−ϕ(t(π(p))(p))) ◦ Φ1−ϕ(t(π(p))(p) = Φϕ(t(π(p)) ◦ Φ1−ϕ(t(π(p))(p) =
=Φϕ(t(π(p))+1−ϕ(t(π(p))(p) = Φ1(p) = Φ(p)
(4.3)
Thus any Φ ∈ AutV (P ) is in fact in D
2 and D1 ⊂ D2 = . . . = Dn = ~D = AutV (P ). Again one
has no freedom in choosing G and it necessarily agrees with G = AutV (P ) = S confirming the
assumptions which is generally done in the literature.
Thus the only case in which one can have the gauge group strictly smaller than the symmetry
group is in general relativistic theories on a spacetime with a non-compact space. To the best
of our knowledge, this problem seems not to have been considered in the literature where the
standard choice G = S is assumed without discussion. On the other hand, further investigations
are needed to possibly produce a clear counter example showing that one could have ~D S as
we conjectured could happen (or to prove that the conjecture is false and the standard choice
is forced in general on a mathematical stance).
Appendix A. Results for D3
Let us assume notation as in Section 3. Let us now show that Φ 6∈ D3. Again for the sake of
arguments let us suppose that Φ = φ1 ◦ φ2 ◦ φ3 and, with the same notation as above, assume
that I1 < I3.
Case (a): one has I1 < I3 < I2. Then let us set J = φ
−1
3 (U2). We have U3 < J and
U1 < U3 < φ3(J) = U2. Accordingly, one should have U1 < Φ(J) = φ1(U2) and J is a stripe,
not a vertical stripe but still a stripe going to infinity on both sides. Thus, Φ drives the stripe
J around in the spiral and sooner or later one is forced to have points in Φ(J) on the left of
U1, which is a contradiction.
Case (b): one has I1 < I2 < I3. Let us set J = U3. Then one has U2 < φ3(U3) = U3, and
U1 < U2 < φ2 ◦φ3(U3). Thus one should have U1 < Φ(U3). However, Φ drives the stripe around
in the spiral and sooner or later one is forced to have points in Φ(U3) on the left of U1, which
is a contradiction.
Case (c): one has I2 < I1 < I3. Consider J = φ
−1
3 (U2) < U3. Then one has φ3(J) = U2 < U1
and φ2 ◦ φ3(J) = U2 < U1 and accordingly, Φ(J) < U1. However, Φ drives the stripe around in
the spiral and sooner or later one is forced to have points in Φ(J) on the right of U1, which is
a contradiction.
Since one cannot have any of these cases and I1, I2, I3 are pairwise disjoint intervals (otherwise
Φ would be in D2) then one can conclude that Φ 6∈ D3.
A similar proof for D4 should consider 4!/2 = 12 possible subcases of different orderings.
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Appendix B. General Results for Dn
Actually, some general result is available and could simplify the general proof for Dn.
For example, in D3 one can show that some of the orderings cannot appear since they actually
correspond to morphisms in D2.
For example, let us assume Φ = φ1 ◦ φ2 ◦ φ3 ∈ D
3 with I1 < I2 < I3 and where φi ∈ D
1 are
Cauchy diffeomorphisms. Each of the Cauchy transformation φi can be split as φi = φ
+
i ◦ φ
−
i =
φ−i ◦ φ
+
i where φ
±
i are the identity on the left (on the right) of Ii.
Then one has that φ+i ◦ φ
−
i = φ
−
i ◦ φ
+
i and that for example φ
+
1 ◦ φ
+
2 = φ˜
+
1 (and similarly
φ−1 ◦ φ
−
2 = φ˜
−
2 , respectively) where the transformation φ˜
+
1 (φ˜
−
2 , respectively) is the identity on
the left (right, respectively) of I1 (I2, respectively).
Then one has a set of moves to simplify a sequence. For example:
φ1 ◦ φ2 ◦ φ3 =φ
+
1 ◦ (φ
−
1 ◦ φ
−
2 ) ◦ (φ
+
2 ◦ φ
+
3 ) ◦ φ
−
3 = φ
+
1 ◦ φ˜
−
2 ◦ φ˜
+
2 ◦ φ
−
3 =
=φ+1 ◦ φ˜
+
2 ◦ φ˜
−
2 ◦ φ
−
3 = φ˜
+
1 ◦ φ˜
−
3 ∈ D
2
(B.1)
Analogously one can prove that a transformation Φ = φ1 ◦ φ2 ◦ φ3 ∈ D
3 with I3 < I2 < I1
is in fact in D2. Accordingly, whenever one finds a sequence of three Cauchy transformations
which are the identity on stripes Ui which are ordered as (or in reverse order) the composition
ordering, they actually simplify to lower order.
This lemma simplifies the proof that Φ 6∈ D4. For example let us consider a map Φ =
φ1 ◦φ2 ◦φ3 ◦ φ4 ∈ D
4 with I3 < I4 < I2 < I1, this is actually in D
3 since the stripes I3 < I2 < I1
appears in reverse order.
By this techniques one can show that in fact only 5 of the 12 possible orderings need to be
analysed for D4. On a similar basis one needs to analyse 14 of the 60 possible orderings need
to be analysed for D5. However, one would need to investigate if there exist other cases which
simplify besides the ordered triples.
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